Freedom of Information
Indirectly, it is assumed that the flow of information in digital markets is free. But as the costs of data collection, processing and transportation decrease, the question of ownership of information arises in a new way.
Does a search engine have the right to use information previously collected by another site?
The siege strategy, which involves separation between a site and the end customer, is close to free-riding even where the service rendered is not negligible.
For now, such a situation is accepted by search engines. The same is not true for shop robots.
In general, it is about accessing information available on the Web.
Will merchant sites have the right to refuse to be spied on by store robots? Admittedly yes, but would it be in their interest to reduce their potential audience in this way? Can a site refuse to receive links from another site?
Undoubtedly yes. But North American case law seems to be geared towards freedom of linking without first asking the authority of the site to which one is pointing (provided, however, that one does not resort to frameworks to impose advertising).
Can an engine refuse to be interrogated by a software agent and not by a human client?
The bottom line is the commercial value of hypertext links and Web browsing support services that will greatly condition the fluidity of the markets for the end customer.
Are prices acceptable to consumers in virtual markets?
The Internet enables companies and distributors to expand their yield management techniques by providing advanced and rapidly updated pricing tools.
Using the example of air transport, some economists have wondered whether such prices are acceptable to consumers, as they challenge the impression of fair prices.
Thus, he argues, the risk of over-optimized prices appearing arbitrary and unfair to the point where it will be driven to regulation.
Even regardless of their acceptability, prices defined in a market from the interaction of negotiating agents with pricing agents do not always lead to equilibrium states, not to mention optimal states.
For example, simulations performed by IBM on populations of trading agents depend on the learning algorithms used.
This indicates that the total surplus may be higher or lower and may also be more or less confiscated by trade intermediaries.
The very low cost of exchanging and processing information today, therefore, does not necessarily lead to better functioning of the markets.
With the increasing ability of customers to compare products come more sophisticated ways of setting and changing prices. Such more complex markets are not necessarily more active. They are arguably more indecisive.
The Importance of Brand Attachment in Virtual Markets
Due to the information asymmetry between the seller and the buyer, the seller must be able to make a reliable commitment to the features of the product and the services to be provided thereafter. (After-sales service, supply, supply) Conversely, the buyer must be able to guarantee his solvency to the buyer.
Thus, confidence is a fundamental element of market action. In the case of virtual markets, this is even more true, both due to the greater presence of interested players, the global expansion of markets, and, finally, the proliferation of direct sales between individuals.
It is therefore necessary for players to be able to build a reputation, which auction sites allow, for example, by providing a ranking of sellers and buyers based on the history of their exchange.
More generally, third party services may provide information and insurance services. It can even provide escrow services for goods or payments.
Such systems seem effective at creating relative trust, at least in the case of routine exchanges. To some extent, the trust thus created replaces the trust built around a brand, a manufacturer, or a distributor.
It should be noted that this new source of trust resides on a third-party site that monitors those who interact and publishes a quality index.
Brand power will shift, at least in part, from manufacturers and distributors to mediation websites. What would be the dynamics of brands on the Web then? How would they rule? Would they be more involved than in actual markets?
Comparing the web and traditional media highlights an extreme distribution of viewers (if we compare sites to some kind of channel or program).
This is generally an indication that when e-commerce develops, the customer base will be very dispersed and the branding power of the sites will weaken relatively.
However, simulations on theoretical Webs of identical sites show that brand loyalty (the tendency to return to sites already visited) and reputation impact.
On the real Web, for example, in forums, chats, personal sites, etc. given that exchanges between internet users are so frequent, customers are more likely to focus on trademarks than existing brands.
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